By Raza Syed(London)
On August 8, 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump hosted Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev at the White House, resulting in a historic peace declaration aimed at resolving the decades-long conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, an enclave internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan but historically populated by ethnic Armenians.
This agreement, though not a comprehensive treaty, marks a significant shift from Russian-dominated mediation to U.S. involvement, driven by Moscow’s waning influence after its 2022 Ukraine invasion. Central to the deal is the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP), a transit corridor through Armenia’s Syunik province (historically Zangezur) connecting Azerbaijan’s mainland to its Nakhchivan exclave, with the U.S. securing exclusive development rights for 99 years to build infrastructure like roads, rails, pipelines, and fiber optics.
As of August 18, 2025, amid Iran’s opposition and EU calls for swift ratification, the agreement raises critical questions: Does it favor Armenia, or does it tilt toward Azerbaijan, and what is its future?
The conflict’s roots trace to 1921, when Joseph Stalin assigned the Armenian-majority Nagorno-Karabakh to Soviet Azerbaijan, sowing ethnic tensions. As the USSR collapsed in the late 1980s, Karabakh’s Armenians sought unification with Armenia, sparking pogroms and the First Nagorno-Karabakh War (1988–1994). Armenian forces, backed by Russia, seized Karabakh and seven surrounding districts, displacing over 600,000 Azerbaijanis and causing around 30,000 deaths.
A 1994 ceasefire, mediated by the OSCE Minsk Group (co-chaired by Russia, the U.S., and France), held uneasily until 2020, when Azerbaijan, supported by Turkish drones and military aid, recaptured significant territory in a 44-day offensive, leading to a Russian-brokered truce with peacekeepers. In 2023, Azerbaijan’s swift operation reclaimed the remaining enclave, prompting over 100,000 ethnic Armenians to flee—a humanitarian crisis some label as ethnic cleansing—leaving Armenia isolated and open to Western mediation.
The 2025 declaration affirms mutual recognition of territorial integrity, cessation of hostilities, and the TRIPP corridor’s development under Armenian law but with U.S. oversight. The U.S. also waived Section 907 restrictions on aid to Azerbaijan, signaling closer ties with Baku. Proponents view it as a pivot from Russian influence, potentially revitalizing Silk Road trade routes and integrating the South Caucasus into global markets, bypassing Iran and Russia. For Armenia, the deal offers economic lifelines post-2023: reopened routes could boost exports, tourism, and investment, reducing reliance on Russia. Pashinyan called it a “significant milestone” for stability.
However, protests in Yerevan decry it as a sovereignty compromise, with no provisions for Karabakh Armenians’ return, prisoner releases, or cultural heritage protection. Iran’s president visited Armenia on August 11, 2025, warning of military drills and viewing the corridor as NATO encroachment, while the EU urges ratification and Russia, though sidelined, retains spoiler potential.
The deal appears asymmetric, favoring Azerbaijan due to its recent military gains and strategic demands met without equivalent concessions. Baku secures unimpeded access to Nakhchivan, strengthening ties with Turkey and its role as a European energy hub. Armenia, weakened by losses, gains formal peace and Western alignment but hosts foreign infrastructure on its soil for a century. While economic diversification is a pro, unresolved humanitarian issues and Iran’s opposition raise vulnerability fears, making the deal less favorable to Armenia in territorial and security terms.
Opinions of three Experts from Armenia to provide diverse perspectives, here are insights from three experts on the agreement’s implications:
Dr. Gevorg Melikyan, Founder of the Armenian Institute for Resilience & Statecraft, Ex
Furthermore, Azerbaijan’s president continues to impose unacceptable preconditions for peace, including demanding changes to Armenia’s constitution (which is already a clear violation of the Article IV of the Agreement on Establishment of Peace and Inter-State Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan, which stipulates that “the Parties shall refrain from intervening with the internal affairs of each other”), signaling an indefinite process that undermines Armenia’s sovereignty and security.
Additionally, the deal offers no real military guarantees for Armenia. The agreement primarily serves economic and geopolitical interests of major powers and regional actors, leaving Armenia even more vulnerable and dependent.
Critically, Armenia’s leadership lacks a clear military strategy and foreign policy, focusing more on political survival at the eve of the Parliamentary elections in 2026 than national security, even at the cost of leasing sovereign territory to foreign powers.
The agreement could be a catalyst for economic development, provide US diplomatic support, and open up opportunities for new regional cooperation. However, it also entails certain concessions to state sovereignty, internal political conflicts, and security uncertainties.
A major threat is Iran’s negative reaction in the vicinity of the corridor, which could lead to tension and regional complications.
Thus, the agreement can become a path to security and development for Armenia only if it is fully, fairly, and adequately implemented. Otherwise, the risks outweigh the potential benefits.
Armenia should exercise restraint, prudence, and political unity, guided by the interests of the state and people.
“Why are Armenian prisoners still detained in Baku?” Babayan asked, highlighting the agreement’s failure to secure their release. He also questioned the U.S. decision to waive Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, which previously restricted military aid to Azerbaijan, asking, “For whom is this repeal intended, and against whom will Azerbaijan arm itself?” Uncertainty persists over whether displaced Armenians from Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) will be allowed to return and whether Azerbaijan will withdraw from occupied Armenian territories, such as Jermuk.
Babayan criticized Armenia’s concessions, including the dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group, a long-standing mediator, and the transfer of a strategic Syunik corridor to U.S. oversight for 99 years. These moves risk provoking Iran, which views the corridor as a geopolitical threat, and straining ties with Russia, a vital economic partner. “This reconciliation rests on words and promises, not substance,” Babayan stated, emphasizing that without clear answers to these issues, the agreement inspires little confidence.
While acknowledging the value of peace, Babayan warned that the lack of transparency and accountability—particularly on prisoner releases, Artsakh’s displaced population, and Azerbaijan’s territorial intentions—renders the declaration inadequate. For true peace, he urged, these critical questions must be addressed to ensure a just and sustainable resolution.
In conclusion, while offering Armenia economic and alliance opportunities, the agreement favors Azerbaijan through strategic gains, reflecting power imbalances. Its success hinges on implementation and geopolitical cooperation, potentially ushering in stability or deepening vulnerabilities.
