By Mohammad Raashid
Afghanistan has long been described by international analysts as a “breeding ground” or safe haven for militant groups, a characterization rooted in decades of war, foreign intervention, political collapse, and extremist entrenchment.
While the label remains controversial and does not reflect the views or experiences of ordinary Afghans, who have largely been victims of prolonged conflict, the country’s recent history shows how militant networks have repeatedly found space to operate within its borders.
Origins in the Soviet-Afghan War
The foundations of Afghanistan’s militant ecosystem trace back to the 1979–1989 Soviet-Afghan War. After the Soviet invasion in 1979, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) funneled billions of dollars in arms and funding to Afghan Mujahideen fighters.
The war attracted thousands of foreign volunteers known as “Afghan Arabs,” including Osama bin Laden. These fighters developed transnational jihadist networks during the conflict. In 1988–89, bin Laden helped establish Al-Qaeda as a base organization to support global jihadist activities.
When Soviet forces withdrew in 1989, Afghanistan plunged into civil war among rival Mujahideen factions. The chaos paved the way for the rise of the Taliban in the mid-1990s. Promising order under strict Islamic law, the Taliban captured Kabul in 1996 and ruled most of the country until 2001.
Taliban Rule and Global Terrorism
During their first period in power (1996–2001), the Taliban provided sanctuary to Al-Qaeda, allowing it to operate training camps and plan international attacks. Al-Qaeda orchestrated the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in East Africa and the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States from Afghan soil.
The Taliban’s refusal to hand over bin Laden following the 9/11 attacks triggered a U.S.-led invasion that toppled their regime in late 2001.
After the withdrawal of U.S. and NATO forces in August 2021, the Taliban regained control of Afghanistan. Under the Doha Agreement signed with the United States in 2020, the group pledged not to allow Afghan territory to be used for international terrorism.
In July 2022, Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri was killed in a U.S. drone strike while residing in a Kabul safe house, raising questions about Taliban compliance with counterterrorism commitments.
United Nations reports through 2025 have indicated that Al-Qaeda maintains a presence in multiple Afghan provinces. The Taliban leadership has denied enabling international terrorism but has faced criticism for not dismantling certain networks.
Meanwhile, the Taliban has engaged in violent clashes with its rival, Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), which has carried out high-profile attacks on civilians, religious minorities such as the Hazara community, and Taliban officials. Regional security agencies have also linked ISKP to international plots, including the 2024 Moscow concert hall attack.
Another major concern is the presence of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which operates along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Pakistani authorities have repeatedly accused the Afghan Taliban of allowing TTP fighters to use Afghan territory to stage cross-border attacks. Islamabad reported over 2,500 fatalities from TTP-related violence in 2024 alone.
Afghanistan’s rugged geography, particularly the Hindu Kush mountains and remote desert regions has historically made centralized control difficult. The Durand Line border with Pakistan further complicates enforcement efforts, enabling cross-border movement of fighters, weapons, and narcotics.
Socio-Economic Drivers
Decades of war have left Afghanistan among the world’s poorest countries, high unemployment, limited educational access especially for women and girls under Taliban restrictions and economic isolation create fertile conditions for recruitment into militant organizations.
The narcotics trade remains another destabilizing factor. Afghanistan has historically been the world’s largest producer of opium, with proceeds from cultivation and trafficking providing funding streams for armed groups over the years.
Cultural and tribal dynamics also play a role. The Pashtunwali code, emphasizing hospitality and protection of guests, has at times been cited by analysts as complicating efforts to apprehend or expel militant figures.
Geopolitical Dimensions
Regional geopolitics have further shaped Afghanistan’s security landscape. U.S. and Indian officials blaming ISI, provided backing to the Taliban and the Haqqani Network during the 2001–2021 insurgency, viewing them as instruments of strategic influence. Pakistani authorities have denied supporting terrorism but acknowledge the complexity of managing cross-border militancy.
Over time, various external actors, including private donors from Gulf countries, have also been accused of contributing funds that indirectly strengthened militant networks.
A Changing but Persistent Threat
Although Afghanistan is no longer considered the singular global epicenter of jihadist activity with extremist networks now active across parts of Africa and the Middle East, security analysts say it remains a permissive environment for regional militant operations targeting Pakistan, Iran, and Central Asian states and now a big threat for Chinese interest in the region especially for CPEC. The safe houses of Baloch insurance groups sponsored by RAW also a big threat for both China and Pakistan. In the northern areas of Afghanistan ETIM presence is a giant threat for Chinese and Taliban administration also contributed the share to ETIM fighter in his army and deputed in Northern areas e.g. Badakhshan etc.
U.S. policymakers have periodically debated whether to redesignate the Taliban as a foreign terrorist organization, though no final decision has been announced. The Observers note that Afghanistan’s “terror nursery” label stems from recurring historical cycles, foreign intervention fuels insurgency, state collapse creates vacuums, militant groups establish safe havens and renewed conflict follows.
Experts argue that breaking this pattern would require stable governance, inclusive political structures, economic alternatives to narcotics, expanded education, and sustained regional cooperation. Under current Taliban rule, many of those conditions remain absent.
The Russian Foreign Ministry recently released a report (published around February 23, 2026) on the situation in Afghanistan. It estimates that between 20,000 and 23,000 fighters from various international terrorist organizations are currently operating in the country. According to the report, more than half of these are foreign nationals (i.e., non-Afghans).
Key details from the report and related coverage include:
The overall security and political situation in Afghanistan remain fragile and complex, with terrorist networks as a major source of instability.
Specific groups mentioned:
ISIS (Islamic State Khorasan Province / Daesh): Around 3,000 fighters.
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP): 5,000–7,000 members.
Al-Qaeda: 400–1,500.
Other groups like the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP), East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and Ansarullah are also noted as active, with training camps and logistical networks in Afghanistan.
The report highlights concern over these groups posing threats to regional stability, including potential cross-border activities (e.g., TTP attacks in Pakistan) and issues like drug trafficking.
The Taliban (Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan) has rejected these claims, with spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid calling the figures and sources inaccurate, insisting Afghanistan is secure and no foreign armed groups operate there.
This assessment aligns with broader concerns from Russia (and others like the UN, China, and Pakistan) about persistent terrorism risks in Afghanistan post-2021 Taliban takeover.
For millions of Afghans, however, the primary reality is not geopolitics but survival navigating poverty, sanctions, and insecurity in a country that has endured more than four decades of continuous conflict.
