During the Iran-Israel conflict in June 2025, Iranian missile and drone attack on Israel marked a watershed moment in Middle Eastern security dynamics. As Israel responded to the unprecedented assault, speculation surged over the role of Arab countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Iraq, with claims that they assisted Israel either through intelligence-sharing or direct defensive actions.
The most substantiated and widely reported involvement came from Jordan. During the Iranian assault, Jordan’s air force intercepted several flying objects, including drones that entered its airspace. Reuters and The Wall Street Journal both confirmed that Jordan took defensive action, including shutting down its airspace temporarily. Jordan’s capital Amman justified the interceptions on the grounds of national sovereignty, stating that the objects posed a threat to Jordanian citizens and were shot down accordingly.
While Jordan did not acknowledge that these drones were targeting Israel, defense analysts have widely concluded that they were part of Iran’s broader strike package, possibly intended to reach Israeli territory.
Jordan’s response aligns with its long-standing policy of maintaining a neutral public stance on Israeli military matters, especially given strong domestic opposition to normalization with Israel. Despite having a peace treaty and a history of security coordination with Israel, Jordan carefully avoids giving the impression of acting on Israel’s behalf. Still, its air defense activity during the attack effectively contributed to shielding Israel, if only indirectly.
In contrast, the alleged involvement of Saudi Arabia and Iraq remains ambiguous and largely unconfirmed. Reports from outlets such as The Wall Street Journal and Times of Israel cited unnamed officials suggesting that Saudi Arabia, along with United Arab Emirates and Egypt, provided intelligence or early-warning data to United States and possibly to Israel in anticipation of the Iranian attack. This data allegedly included radar information that helped intercept incoming threats. However, no public statement from Riyadh or Abu Dhabi has confirmed these reports, and the claims have not been independently verified.
Pro-Iranian media, particularly Lebanon-based Al-Mayadeen, went further by accusing Iraq of supplying intelligence to Israel. Baghdad swiftly denied these allegations. Iraqi authorities stated unequivocally that they played no role in the conflict and emphasized that Iranian drones traversed Iraqi airspace en route to Israel, further undermining claims of cooperation.
The possibility of a broader regional effort led by the United States is more credible. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) has long maintained joint defense relationships with Gulf countries, particularly in airspace monitoring and ballistic missile defense. During the incident, CENTCOM reportedly coordinated a regional air defense effort, involving assets from the United States, UK, France, Jordan, and potentially others. Western fighter jets and naval systems helped intercept Iranian drones and missiles, creating a layered defense shield.
While CENTCOM has confirmed some aspects of this operation, including the role of U.S. aircraft and defense systems in aiding Israel, direct Arab-Israeli military coordination has not been publicly acknowledged.
This is not surprising. Most Arab governments are highly cautious about being seen as cooperating militarily with Israel, particularly in the absence of a resolution to the Palestinian issue. Such cooperation, even if practical, carries significant political risks at home and across the wider Muslim world.
The larger question centers on the balance Arab states seek between regional security needs and public perception. Saudi Arabia, for instance, has complex relations with both Iran and Israel. While it has not normalized ties with Israel, it has engaged in quiet backchannel talks with Israeli and U.S. officials. Riyadh is also wary of Tehran’s expanding regional influence and ballistic capabilities. It is plausible that, behind the scenes, Saudi Arabia shared certain airspace surveillance data or allowed limited transit of military aircraft. But these actions remain speculative in the absence of official acknowledgment.
The Wall Street Journal published a detailed analysis arguing that Israel’s ability to repel nearly 99% of Iran’s 300 missiles and drones was due in part to support from Arab countries, especially through intelligence sharing. The article noted that a fragile but functional network of U.S.-aligned regional actors emerged during the crisis, helping to neutralize the Iranian threat. However, even in this report, the specifics of Arab involvement are attributed to anonymous sources and not backed by hard evidence.
From a geopolitical perspective, these reports appear designed to signal growing regional alignment against Iran, without triggering domestic backlash within Arab countries. If anything, they reflect how regional security partnerships are evolving under the radar. Arab states are increasingly aware that Iran’s missile and drone programs pose a shared threat. This shared concern has pushed countries like Jordan and the UAE closer to the U.S.-Israel security sphere-albeit unofficially.
The strategic calculus is evident: support the collective defense framework against Iran while maintaining public distance from Israel. It is a delicate balancing act. Jordan, for example, supports Palestinian statehood, has frozen certain forms of cooperation with Israel due to the Gaza war, and has even forfeited a football match against Israel in protest. Yet when its airspace and sovereignty are under threat, Jordan acts decisively, and if that action incidentally benefits Israel, so be it.
Saudi Arabia’s position is even more complex. It remains engaged in regional diplomacy and post-war ceasefire frameworks, particularly around Gaza. It has called for an end to Israeli aggression and remains a vocal advocate of Palestinian rights. Nonetheless, it also aligns with Washington on containing Iranian influence and has taken measured steps toward security normalization, such as participating in shared air defense drills.
No less significant is Saudi Arabia’s reported logistical facilitation of Israeli commerce via UAE ports during the war, as reported by several logistics analysts. When Houthi attacks disrupted Israeli shipping to the port of Eilat, goods were rerouted through UAE ports and transported overland via Saudi and Jordanian routes. While not formally acknowledged, this tacit allowance would indicate a quiet form of cooperation with Israeli economic needs, another example of practical convergence under the guise of political separation.
In conclusion, only Jordan’s involvement in the conflict has been officially confirmed, and even that was limited to intercepting drones and missiles that entered its airspace. There is no direct evidence that Saudi Arabia or Iraq actively assisted Israel, although speculation about intelligence sharing persists. The broader story appears to be one of defensive regional coordination; led by the United States and supported by willing partners, rather than a deliberate Arab-Israeli military alliance.
These events underscore how narratives around Arab support for Israel are often amplified for strategic purposes, particularly by pro-Iranian media eager to paint Arab governments as betraying the Palestinian cause. In reality, Arab states continue to tread a cautious path: safeguarding national security and countering regional threats while avoiding public entanglement in Israel’s wars.
The Iran-Israel confrontation may have revealed more about emerging threat perceptions in the region than about shifting alliances. For now, Jordan’s confirmed actions remain the only verified instance of Arab involvement. The rest; at least in the absence of new disclosures; should be regarded as plausible but unconfirmed components of a highly sensitive and evolving geopolitical landscape.
