By Dr.Majid Khan/Uzair Ahmad Tahir
Nuclear proliferation, the spread of nuclear weapons and related technology to states not recognized as Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), has been a persistent global concern. The dynamics of nuclear proliferation drive a global arms race, challenging international security and stability.
The origins of nuclear proliferation date back to World War II, with the United States’ development and subsequent use of atomic bombs. In response, the Soviet Union accelerated its own nuclear weapons program, initiating the Cold War-era arms race. By the 1950s and 1960s, both the U.S. and the USSR had stockpiled nuclear weapons capable of mutual destruction. Recognizing the dangers of such an arms race, several international efforts were made to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and promote disarmament.
The NPT, which entered into force in 1970, was a critical step in these efforts. It established a framework in which five states (the US, Russia, the UK, France, and China) were recognized as NWS and obligated not to transfer nuclear weapons or assist non-nuclear-weapon states in developing them. However, the treaty has faced limitations, especially as other countries such as India, Pakistan, and North Korea pursued and obtained nuclear capabilities outside of the NPT framework.
In the decades following the Cold War, the nuclear arms race did not disappear; rather, it evolved with new players and heightened geopolitical tensions. Nuclear-armed countries continue to modernize their arsenals, making weapons more sophisticated and, in some cases, more usable in conflict. Recent advancements include miniaturized warheads, hypersonic delivery vehicles, and improvements in missile defence. These developments intensify the risk of miscalculation, particularly in regions with historical animosities, such as South Asia and the Middle East.
India and Pakistan, both nuclear-armed, are notable examples of regional nuclear rivals. Since India’s nuclear tests in 1974 and Pakistan’s in 1998, both nations have been in a precarious arms race. Their rivalry has spurred them to expand their nuclear arsenals and diversify their delivery systems, leading to fears of a regional nuclear escalation, particularly given unresolved border disputes.
Concerns about nuclear proliferation are not only limited to states actively developing nuclear programs. Another dangerous aspect is the black-market trade of nuclear materials, especially uranium, which has been detected multiple times in India. Compounding these risks are incidents involving the illicit trade of uranium raises alarms about regional threats and the efficacy of international oversight.
One such incident occurred in 2021, when approximately 7 kilograms of natural uranium were seized in Maharashtra, India. Authorities arrested two individuals involved in the transaction, highlighting the ease with which such materials can slip into the black market. Later, another case emerged where a sizable amount of uranium was confiscated from individuals trying to sell it in Jharkhand. This illegal trade underscores significant security vulnerabilities and raises concerns about the potential for these materials to be acquired by terrorist organizations or hostile state actors.
These incidents have heightened regional and international fears. The South Asian region is particularly vulnerable to nuclear escalation due to the historical tension between India and Pakistan. Nuclear material proliferation through black-market channels exacerbates these risks, as it could lead to non-state actors or militant groups gaining access to such materials. This would not only threaten local populations but could also destabilize the entire region. A radiological attack, or even the threat of one, could have devastating economic, political, and social impacts, spreading fear and uncertainty across borders.
Moreover, the existence of a black-market trade in nuclear materials complicates the already challenging task of nuclear non-proliferation. Given the difficulty of tracking and intercepting such transactions, these materials could end up in countries with hostile intentions toward India or Pakistan, further destabilizing regional security. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has called for tighter controls, but enforcement remains inconsistent.
While the United Nations has worked to address nuclear proliferation through agencies like the IAEA and frameworks such as the NPT, these efforts have been far from sufficient. Although the IAEA monitors compliance and promotes peaceful nuclear technology, its mandate is limited regarding direct enforcement. Many nuclear and aspiring nuclear states operate outside of the NPT or resist oversight, undermining the effectiveness of global non-proliferation efforts.
United Nations Security Council has also been criticized for its inaction or delayed response to nuclear threats. For instance, North Korea’s nuclear program proceeded relatively unchecked, despite multiple rounds of sanctions and diplomatic efforts. With limited ability to enforce nuclear security measures in member states, the UN is often reliant on national governments to secure nuclear materials, a responsibility that, as evidenced by incidents in India, is not always effectively managed.
Addressing the risks associated with nuclear proliferation and black-market uranium requires a multi-faceted approach. Effective nuclear security demands robust cooperation among nations, particularly in intelligence-sharing and joint enforcement efforts. Countries must work together to dismantle nuclear smuggling networks and prevent the transfer of sensitive materials.
Countries like India need to improve their regulatory frameworks and security protocols for handling nuclear materials. This includes better background checks, surveillance, and enforcement mechanisms to prevent the sale and transport of uranium on the black market.
The UN and the IAEA need to enhance their frameworks for non-compliance penalties and enforcement actions. Greater power to intervene in cases of black-market proliferation or inadequate national oversight could mitigate risks.
The path forward requires a unified, rigorous approach that prioritizes nuclear security, strengthens international cooperation, and holds states accountable for lapses in nuclear oversight. Only by addressing these risks collectively can the international community hope to curb the nuclear race and prevent the catastrophic consequences of unchecked nuclear proliferation
